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Abstract
As data-driven predictive models are increasingly used to inform decisions, it has been argued
that decision makers should provide explanations that help individuals understand what would have
to change for these decisions to be beneficial ones. However, there has been little discussion on the
possibility that individuals may use the above counterfactual explanations to invest effort strategi-
cally and maximize their chances of receiving a beneficial decision. In this paper, our goal is to find
policies and counterfactual explanations that are optimal in terms of utility in such a strategic setting.
We first show that, given a pre-defined policy, the problem of finding the optimal set of counterfac-
tual explanations is NP-hard. Then, we show that the corresponding objective is nondecreasing and
satisfies submodularity and this allows a standard greedy algorithm to enjoy approximation guaran-
tees. In addition, we further show that the problem of jointly finding both the optimal policy and
set of counterfactual explanations reduces to maximizing a non-monotone submodular function. As
a result, we can use a recent randomized algorithm to solve the problem, which also offers approx-
imation guarantees. Finally, we demonstrate that, by incorporating a matroid constraint into the
problem formulation, we can increase the diversity of the optimal set of counterfactual explanations
and incentivize individuals across the whole spectrum of the population to self improve. Experiments
on synthetic and real lending and credit card data illustrate our theoretical findings and show that
the counterfactual explanations and decision policies found by our algorithms achieve higher utility
than several competitive baselines.
1 Introduction
Whenever a bank decides to offer a loan to a customer, a judge decides to grant bail to a person, or a
company decides to hire a new employee, the decision is increasingly informed by a data-driven predictive
model. In all these high-stakes applications, the goal of the decision maker is to take decisions that ma-
ximize a given utility function while the goal of the predictive model is to provide accurate predictions
of the outcomes from a set of observable features. For example, a bank may decide whether or not to
offer a loan to a customer using the model’s estimate of the probability that the customer would repay
the loan.
In this context, there has been a tremendous excitement on the potential of data-driven predictive
models to enhance decision making in high-stakes applications. However, there has also been a heated
debate about their lack of transparency and explainability (Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017; Weller, 2017;
Lipton, 2018; Gunning and Aha, 2019; Rudin, 2019). As a result, there already exists a legal requirement
to grant individuals who are subject to (semi)-automated decision making the right-to-explanation in
the European Union (Voigt and Von dem Bussche, 2017; Wachter et al., 2017a). With this motivation,
there has been a flurry of work on interpretable machine learning (Ribeiro et al., 2016; Koh and Liang,
2017; Lundberg and Lee, 2017; Chakraborty et al., 2017; Murdoch et al., 2019; Wachter et al., 2017b;
Karimi et al., 2019; Mothilal et al., 2020), which has predominantly focused on developing methods to
find explanations for the predictions made by a predictive model. Within this line of work, the work
most closely related to ours (Wachter et al., 2017b; Karimi et al., 2019; Mothilal et al., 2020) aims to find
counterfactual explanations that help individuals understand what would have to change for a predictive
model to make a positive prediction about them. In our work, rather than explaining predictions, we
pursue the development of methods to find counterfactual explanations for the decisions taken by a
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decision maker1, which are ultimately what individuals who are subject to (semi)-automated decision
making typically care about. In this context, we will assume that the decision maker takes decisions
based on low dimensional feature vectors since, in many realistic scenarios, the data is summarized by
just a small number of summary statistics (e.g., FICO scores) (Hardt et al., 2016b; Liu et al., 2018).
Once we focus on explaining decisions, we cannot overlook the possibility that individuals may use
these explanations to invest effort strategically in order to maximize their chances of receiving a benefi-
cial decision. However, this is also an opportunity for us to find counterfactual explanations that help
individuals to self-improve and eventually increase the utility of a decision policy, as noted by several
studies in economics (Coate and Loury, 1993; Fryer and Loury, 2013; Hu and Chen, 2018) and, more
recently, in the computer science literature (Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2019; Perdomo et al., 2020; Tabib-
ian et al., 2020). For example, if a bank explains to a customer that, if she reduces her credit card debt
by 20%, she will receive the loan she is applying for, she may feel compelled to reduce her overall credit
card debt by the proposed percentage to pay less interest, improving her financial situation, and this
will eventually increase the profit the bank makes when she is able to successfully return the loan. This
is in contrast with previous work on interpretable machine learning, which have ignored the influence
that (counterfactual) explanations (of predictions by a predictive model) may have on the accuracy of
predictive models and the utility of the decision policies.
Our contributions. We cast the above problem as a Stackelberg game in which the decision maker
moves first and shares her counterfactual explanations before individuals best-respond to these expla-
nations and invest effort to receive a beneficial decision. Under this problem formulation, we first show
that, given a pre-defined policy, the problem of finding the optimal set of counterfactual explanations
is NP-hard by using a novel reduction of the Set Cover problem (Karp, 1972). Then, we show that the
corresponding objective function is monotone and submodular and, as a direct consequence, it readily
follows that a standard greedy algorithm offers approximation guarantees. In addition, we show that,
given a pre-defined set of counterfactual explanations, the optimal policy is deterministic and can be
computed in polynomial time. Moreover, building on this result, we can reduce the problem of jointly
finding both the optimal policy and set of counterfactual explanations to maximizing a non-monotone
submodular function. As a consequence, we can use a recent randomized algorithm to solve the problem,
which also offers approximation guarantees. Further, we demonstrate that, by incorporating a matroid
constraint into the problem formulation, we can increase the diversity of the optimal set of counterfactual
explanations and incentivize individuals across the whole spectrum of the population to self improve.
Experiments using real lending and credit card data illustrate our theoretical findings and show that the
counterfactual explanations and decision policies found by the above algorithms achieve higher utility
than several competitive baselines2.
2 Problem Formulation
Given an individual with a feature vector x ∈ {1, ..., n}d and a (ground-truth) label y ∈ {0, 1}, we
assume a decision d(x) ∈ {0, 1} controls whether the corresponding label is realized3. This setting fits a
variety of real-world scenarios, where continuous features are often discretized into (percentile) ranges.
For example, in university admissions, the decision specifies whether a student is admitted (d(x) = 1)
or rejected (d(x) = 0); the label indicates whether the student completes the program (y = 1) or drops
out (y = 0) upon acceptance; and the feature vector (x) may include her GRE scores, undergraduate
GPA percentile, or research experience. Throughout the paper, we will denote the set of feature values
as X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xm}, where m = nd denotes the number of feature values, and assume that the
number of features d is small, as discussed previously.
Each decision is sampled from a decision policy d(x) ∼ pi(d |x), where, for brevity, we will write
pi(x) = pi(d = 1 |x). For each individual, the label y is sampled from a conditional probability distribution
y ∼ P (y |x) and, without loss of generality, we index the feature values in decreasing order with respect
to their corresponding outcome, i.e., i < j ⇒ P (y = 1 |xi) ≥ P (y = 1 |xj). Moreover, we adopt a
1These counterfactual explanations help individuals understand what would have to change in order to receive a beneficial
decision, rather than a positive prediction.
2Data and code to reproduce the results in our paper are publicly available at https://github.com/Networks-Learning/
strategic-decisions.
3Without loss of generality, we assume each feature takes n different values.
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Stackelberg game-theoretic formulation in which each individual with initial feature value xi receives a
(counterfactual) explanation from the decision maker by means of a feature value E(xi) ∈ A ⊆ Ppi :=
{x ∈ X : pi(x) = 1} before she (best-)responds4. This formulation fits a variety of real-world applications.
For example, insurance companies often provide online car insurance simulators that, on the basis of a
customer’s initial feature value xi, let the customer know whether they are eligible for a particular deal.
In case the customer does not qualify, the simulator could provide a counterfactual example E(xi) under
which the individual is guaranteed to be eligible. In the remainder, we will refer to A as the set of
counterfactual explanations and, for each individual with initial feature value xi, we will assume she
does not know anything about the other counterfactual explanations A\E(xi) other individuals may
receive nor the decision policy pi(x).
Now, let c(x, E(xi)) be the cost5 an individual pays for changing from xi to E(xi) and b(pi,x) =
Ed∼pi(d | x)[d(x)] be the (immediate) benefit she obtains from a policy pi, which is just the probability
that the individual receives a positive decision. Then, following Tabibian et al. (2020), each individual’s
best response is to change from her initial feature value xi to E(xi) iff the gained benefit she would
obtain outweighs the cost she would pay for changing features, i.e.,
E(xi) ∈ {xj ∈ X : b(pi,xj)− c(xi,xj) ≥ b(pi,xi)} := R(xi),
and it is to keep her initial feature value xi otherwise. Here, we will refer to R(xi) as the region of
adaptation. Then, at a population level, the above best response results into a transportation of mass
between the original feature distribution P (x) and a new feature distribution P (x |pi,A) induced by the
policy pi and the counterfactual explanations A. More specifically, we can readily derive an analytical
expression for the induced feature distribution in terms of the original feature distribution, i.e., for all
xj ∈ X ,
P (xj |pi,A) = P (xj)I(R(xj) ∩ A = ∅) +
∑
i∈[m]
P (xi)I(E(xi) = xj ∧ xj ∈ R(xi)),
Similarly as in previous work (Corbett-Davies et al., 2017; Valera et al., 2018; Kilbertus et al., 2019;
Tabibian et al., 2020), we will assume that the decision maker is rational, has access to (an estimation
of) the original feature distribution P (x), and aims to maximize the (immediate) utility u(pi, γ), which
is the expected overall profit she obtains, i.e.,
u(pi,A) = Ex∼P (x |pi,A),y∼P (y |x),d∼pi(x) [yd(x)− γd(x)] = Ex∼P (x |pi,A) [pi(x)(P (y = 1 |x)− γ)] , (1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a given constant reflecting economic considerations of the decision maker. For example,
in university admissions, the term pi(x)P (y = 1 |x) is proportional to the expected number of students
who are admitted and complete the program, the term pi(x)γ is proportional to the number of students
who are admitted, and γ measures the cost of education in units of graduated students. As a direct
consequence, given a feature value xi and a set of counterfactual explanations A, we can conclude that,
if R(xi) ∩ A 6= ∅, the decision maker will decide to provide the counterfactual explanation E(xi) that
provides the largest utility gain under the assumption that individuals best respond, i.e.,
E(xi) = argmax
x∈A∩R(xi)
P (y |x) for all xi ∈ X \ Ppi such that R(xi) ∩ A 6= ∅, (2)
and, if R(xi) ∩ A = ∅, we arbitrarily assume that E(xi) = argminx∈A c(xi,x)6.
Given the above preliminaries, our goal is to help the decision maker to first find the optimal set of
counterfactual explanations A for a pre-defined policy in Section 3 and then both the optimal policy pi
and set of counterfactual explanations A in Section 4.
Remarks. Given an individual with initial feature value x, one may think that, by providing the
counterfactual explanation E(x) ∈ A ∩ R(x) that gives the largest utility gain, the decision maker is
not acting in the individual’s best interest but rather selfishly. This is because there may exist another
4In practice, individuals with initial feature values xi such that pi(x) = 1 may not receive any explanation since they
are guaranteed to receive a positive decision.
5In practice, the cost for each pair of feature values may be given by a parameterized function.
6Note that, if A ∩R(xi) = ∅, the individual’s best response is to keep her initial feature value xi and thus any choice
of counterfactual explanation E(xi) leads to the same utility.
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counterfactual explanation x′ ∈ A ∩R(x) with lower cost for the individual, i.e., c(x,x′) ≤ c(x, E(x)).
However, in our work, we argue that the provided counterfactual explanations help the individual to
achieve a greater self-improvement and this is likely to result in a superior long-term well-being. For
example, if a bank explains to a customer that she will receive the loan she is applying for if she reduces
her credit card debt by 10%, rather than 20%, even though the corresponding feature values are both
within the region of adaptation R(x) of her original features x, the customer will be more likely to
default and this will very negatively impact her long-term well-being.
As argued very recently (Miller et al., 2019; Tabibian et al., 2020), due to Goodhart’s law, the con-
ditional probability P (y |x) may change after individuals (best)-respond if the features x are noncausal.
Moreover, Miller et al. (2019) have argued that (best-)responses to noncausal and causal features cor-
respond to gaming and improvement, respectively. In this work, for simplicity, we assume that P (y |x)
does not change, however, it would be very interesting to lift this assumption in future work.
3 Finding the optimal counterfactual explanations for a policy
In this section, our goal is to find the optimal set of counterfactual explanations A∗ for a pre-defined
policy pi, i.e.,
A∗ = argmax
A⊆Ppi : |A|≤k
u(pi,A), (3)
where the cardinality constraint on the set of counterfactual explanations balances the decision maker’s
obligation to be transparent with trade secrets (Barocas et al., 2020). More specifically, note that, without
this constraint, an adversary could reverse-engineer the entire decision policy pi(x) by impersonating
individuals with different feature values x (cs-).
As it will become clearer in the experimental evaluation in Section 6, our results may persuade
decision makers to be transparent about their decision policies, something they are typically reluctant
to be despite the increasing legal requirements, since we show that transparency increases the utility of
the policies. Moreover, throughout this section, we will assume that the decision maker who picks the
pre-defined policy is rational7 and the policy is outcome monotonic89 (Tabibian et al., 2020). Outcome
monotonicity just implies that, the higher an individual’s outcome P (y = 1 |x), the higher their chances
of receiving a positive decision pi(x).
Unfortunately, using a novel reduction of the Set Cover problem (Karp, 1972), the following theorem
reveals that we cannot expect to find the optimal set of counterfactual explanations in polynomial time
(proven in Appendix B.1):
Theorem 1 The problem of finding the optimal set of counterfactual explanations that maximizes utility
under a cardinality constraint is NP-Hard.
Even though Theorem 1 is a negative result, we will now show that the objective function in Eq. 3
satisfies a set of desirable properties, i.e., non-negativity, monotonicity and submodularity10, which allow
a standard greedy algorithm to enjoy approximation guarantees at solving the problem. To this aim,
with a slight abuse of notation, we first express the objective function as a set function f(A) = u(pi,A),
which takes values over the ground set of counterfactual explanations, Ppi. Then, we have the following
proposition (proven in Appendix B.2):
Proposition 2 The function f is non-negative, submodular and monotone.
The above result directly implies that the standard greedy algorithm (Nemhauser et al., 1978) (refer to
Algorithm 1 in Appendix C) will find a solution A to the problem such that f(A) ≥ (1−1/e)f(A∗), where
A∗ is the optimal set of counterfactual explanations. Moreover, since the greedy algorithm computes
the marginal difference of f for at most m elements per iteration and, following from the proof of
Proposition 2, the marginal difference f(A∪{x})−f(A) can be computed in O(m), then it immediately
follows that, in our problem, the greedy algorithm has an overall complexity of O(km2).
7Note that, if the decision maker is rational and her goal is to maximize the utility, as defined in Eq. 1, then, for all
x ∈ X such that P (y = 1 |x) < γ, it holds that pi(x) = 0.
8A policy pi is called outcome monotonic if P (y = 1 |xi) ≥ P (y = 1 |xj)⇔ pi(xi) ≥ pi(xj) ∀xi,xj ∈ X .
9If the policy pi is deterministic, our results also hold for non outcome monotonic policies.
10A function f : 2X → R is submodular if for every A,B ⊆ X : A ⊆ B and x ∈ X \ B it holds that f(A ∪ {x})− f(A) ≥
f(B ∪ {x})− f(B).
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4 Finding the optimal policy and counterfactual explanations
In this section, our goal is to jointly find the optimal decision policy and set of counterfactual explanations
A∗, i.e.,
pi∗,A∗ = argmax
(pi,A):A⊆Ppi∧|A|≤k
u(pi,A) (4)
where, similarly as in the previous section, k is the maximum number of counterfactual explanations
the decision maker is willing to provide to the population to balance the right to explanation with
trade secrets. By jointly optimizing both the decision policy and the counterfactual explanations, we
may obtain an additional gain in terms of utility in comparison with just optimizing for the set of
counterfactual explanations given the optimal decision policy in a non-strategic setting, as shown in
Figure 5 in Appendix D. Moreover, as we will show in the experimental evaluation in Section 6, this
additional gain will be significant.
Similarly as in Section 3, we cannot expect to find the optimal policy and set of counterfactual
explanations in polynomial time. More specifically, we have the following negative result, which easily
follows from Proposition 4 and slightly extending the proof of Theorem 1:
Theorem 3 The problem of jointly finding both the optimal policy and the set of counterfactual expla-
nations that maximize utility under a cardinality constraint is NP-hard.
However, while the problem of finding both the policy and the set of counterfactual explanations
appears significantly more challenging than the problem of finding just the set of counterfactual expla-
nations given a pre-defined policy (refer to Eq. 3), the following proposition shows that the problem is
not inherently harder. More specifically, for each possible set of counterfactual explanations, it shows
that the policy that maximizes the utility can be easily computed (proven in Appendix B.3):
Proposition 4 Given a set of counterfactual explanations A ⊆ Y := {x ∈ X : P (y |x) ≥ γ}11, the policy
pi∗A = argmaxpi:A⊆Ppi u(pi,A) that maximizes the utility is deterministic and can be found in polynomial
time, i.e.,
pi∗A(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ A ∨ {x′ ∈ A : P (y = 1 |x′) > P (y = 1 |x) ∧ c(x,x′) ≤ 1} = ∅}
0 otherwise.
(5)
The above result implies that, to set all the values of the optimal decision policy, we only need to
perform O(km) comparisons. Moreover, it reveals that, in contrast with the non strategic setting, the
optimal policy given a set of counterfactual explanations is not a deterministic threshold rule with a
single threshold (Corbett-Davies et al., 2017; Valera et al., 2018), i.e.,
pi(x) =
{
1 if P (y = 1 |x) ≥ γ
0 otherwise,
(6)
but rather a more conservative deterministic decision policy that does not depend only on the outcome
P (y = 1 |x) and γ but also on the cost individuals pay to change features. Moreover, we can build up on
the above result to prove that the problem of finding the optimal decision policy and set of counterfactual
explanations can be reduced to maximizing a non-monotone submodular function. To this aim, let pi∗A
be the optimal policy induced by a given set of counterfactual explanations A, as in Proposition 4, and
define the set function h(A) = u(pi∗A,A) over the ground set Y. Then, we have the following proposition
(proven in Appendix B.4):
Proposition 5 The function h is non-negative, submodular and non-monotone.
Fortunately, there exist efficient algorithms with global approximation guarantees for maximizing a
non-monotone submodular function under cardinality constraints. For example, Buchbinder et al. (2014)
have proposed a randomized polynomial time algorithm (refer to Algorithm 2 in Appendix C) that can
find a solution A such that h(A) ≥ (1/e)h(A∗), where A∗ and pi∗A∗ are the optimal set of counterfactual
explanations and decision policy, respectively. Moreover, since the above randomized algorithm has a
complexity of O(km) and, following from the proof of Proposition 5, the marginal difference of h can be
computed in O(m), it readily follows that, in our problem, the algorithm has a complexity of O(km2).
11Since the decision maker is rational, she will never provide an explanation that contributes negatively to her utility.
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Figure 1: Utility achieved by five types of decision policies and counterfactual explanations against the
value of the parameter α, which controls how difficult it is to change feature values, in the lending and
credit datasets. In panel (a), the number of feature values is m = 400 and, in panel (b), it is m = 3200.
In both panels, we set k = 0.05m and we repeat each experiment 20 times.
5 Increasing the diversity of the counterfactual explanations
In many cases, decision makers may like to ensure that individuals across the whole spectrum of the
population are incentivized to self-improve. For example, in a loan scenario, the bank may use age
group as a feature to estimate the probability that a customer repays the loan, however, it may like
to deploy a decision policy that incentivizes individuals across all age groups in order to improve the
financial situation of all. To this aim, the decision maker can increase the diversity of the optimal set of
counterfactual explanations by incorporating a matroid constraint into the problem formulation, rather
than a cardinality constraint.
Formally, consider disjoint sets X1,X2, . . . ,Xl such that
⋃
i Xi = X and integers d1, d2, . . . , dl such
that k =
∑
i di. Then, a partition matroid is the collection of sets {S ⊆ 2X : |S ∩ Xi| ≤ di ∀i ∈ [l]}. In
the loan example, the decision maker could search for a set of counterfactual explanations A within a
partition matroid where each one of the Xi’s corresponds to the feature values covered by each age group
and di = k/l ∀i ∈ [l]. This way, the set of counterfactual explanations A would include explanations for
every age group.
In this case, the decision maker could rely on a variety of polynomial time algorithms with global
guarantees for submodular function maximization under matroid constraints, e.g., the algorithm by Ca-
linescu et al. (2011).
6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate Algorithms 1 and 2 using real loan and credit card data and show that the
counterfactual explanations and decision policies found by our algorithms achieve higher utility than
several competitive baselines. Appendix E contains additional experiments on synthetic data.
Experimental setup. We experiment with two publicly available datasets: (i) the lending dataset (len),
which contains information about all accepted loan applications in LendingClub during the 2007-2018
period and (ii) the credit dataset (Yeh and Lien, 2009), which contains information about a bank’s credit
card payoffs12. For each accepted loan applicant (or credit card holder), we use various demographic
information and financial status indicators as features x and the current loan status (or credit payoff
status) as label y. Appendix F contains more details on the specific features we used in each dataset
and also describes the procedure we followed to approximate P (y |x) and estimate the cost function
c(xi,xj).
In our experiments, we compare the utility of the following decision policies and counterfactual
explanations:
— Black box: decisions are taken by the optimal decision policy in the non-strategic setting, given by
Eq. 6, and individuals do not receive any counterfactual explanations.
— Minimum cost: decisions are taken by the optimal decision policy in the non-strategic setting, given
by Eq. 6, and individuals receive counterfactual explanations of minimum cost with respect to their
initial feature values, similarly as in previous work (Ustun et al., 2019; Tolomei et al., 2017; Karimi
et al., 2019). More specifically, we cast the problem of finding the set of counterfactual explanations
12We used a version of the credit dataset preprocessed by Ustun et al. (2019)
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Figure 2: Number of counterfactual explanations and information leakage. Panel (a) shows the utility
achieved by five types of decision policies and counterfactual explanations against the number of coun-
terfactual explanations k. Panel (b) shows the utility achieved by Algorithm 2 against the number of
counterfactual explanations k for several values of the leakage probability pl. In both panels, we use
the lending dataset, the number of feature values is m = 400, we set α = 2, we repeat each experiment
involving randomization 20 times.
as the minimization of the weighted average cost individuals pay to change their feature values to the
closest counterfactual explanation, i.e.,
Amc = argmin
A⊆Ppi : |A|≤k
∑
xi∈X\Ppi
P (xi) min
xj∈A
c(xi,xj),
and realize that this problem is a version of the k-median problem, which we can solve using a greedy
heuristic (Solis-Oba, 2006).
— Diverse: decisions are taken by the optimal decision policy in the non-strategic setting, given by
Eq. 6, and individuals receive a set of diverse counterfactual explanations of minimum cost with respect
to their initial feature values, similarly as in previous work (Russell, 2019; Mothilal et al., 2020), i.e.,
Ad = argmax
A⊆Ppi : |A|≤k
∑
xi∈X\Ppi
P (xi)I(R(xi) ∩ A 6= ∅),
To solve the above problem, we realize it can be reduced to the weighted version of the maximum
coverage problem, which can be solved using a well-known greedy approximation algorithm (Hochbaum
and Pathria, 1998).
— Algorithm 1: decisions are taken by the optimal decision policy in the non-strategic setting, given
by Eq. 6, and individuals receive counterfactual explanations given by Eq. 2, where A is found using
Algorithm 1.
— Algorithm 2: decisions are taken by the decision policy given by Eq. 5 and individuals receive coun-
terfactual explanations given by Eq. 2, where A is found using Algorithm 2.
Results. We start by comparing the utility achieved by each of the decision policies and counterfactual
explanations for several values of the parameter α in both datasets. Figure 1 summarizes the results,
which show that Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 consistently outperform all baselines and, as the cost of
adapting to feature values with higher outcome values decreases (smaller α), the competitive advantage
by jointly optimizing the decision policy and the counterfactual explanations (Algorithm 2) grows sig-
nificantly. This competitive advantage is more apparent in the credit card dataset because it contains
non actionable features (e.g., credit overdue counts) and, under the optimal decision policy in the non-
strategic setting, it is difficult to incentivize individuals who receive a negative decision to improve by
just optimizing the set of counterfactual explanations they receive. Appendix F.3 elaborates more on this
insight by visualizing the transportation of mass induced by the policies and counterfactual explanations
used in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 and Appendix F.4 provides specific examples of counterfactual
explanations provided by Algorithm 1 and the minimum cost baseline.
Next, we focus on the lending dataset and evaluate the sensitivity of our algorithms. First, we measure
the influence that the number of counterfactual explanations has on the utility achieved by each of the
decision policies and counterfactual explanations. As shown in Figure 2(a), our algorithms just need a
small number of counterfactual explanations to provide significant gains in terms of utility with respect
to all the baselines. Second, we challenge the assumption that individuals do not share the counterfactual
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Figure 3: Increasing the diversity of the provided counterfactual explanations. Panel (a) shows the
population per age group, rejected by the optimal threshold policy in the non strategic setting. Panel
(b) shows a comparison of the age distribution of counterfactual explanations inA produced by the greedy
algorithm under a cardinality and a matroid constraint. Panel (c) shows the relative improvement of
each age group. In all panels, we use the credit dataset and we set k = 32 and α = 2.
explanations they receive with other individuals with different feature values. To this end, we assume
that, given the set of counterfactual explanations A found by Algorithm 2, individuals with initial feature
value x receive the counterfactual explanation E(x) ∈ A given by Eq. 2 and, with probability pl, they
also receive an additional explanation E ′(x) picked at random from A and they follow the counterfactual
explanation that benefits them the most. Figure 2(b) summarizes the results for several values of pl
and number of counterfactual explanations, which show that the policies and explanations provided by
Algorithm 2 present a significant utility advantage even when the leakage probability pl is large.
Finally, we focus on the credit dataset and consider a scenario in which a bank aims not only to
continue providing credit to the customers that are more likely to repay but also provide explanations
that incentivize individuals across all age groups to maintain their credit. To this end, we incorpo-
rate a partition matroid constraint that ensures the counterfactual explanations are diverse across age
groups, as described in Section 5, and use a slightly modified version of Algorithm 1 to solve the con-
strained problem (Nemhauser et al., 1978), which enjoys a 1/2 approximation guarantee. Figure 3
summarizes the results, which show that: (i) optimizing under a cardinality constraint leads to an
unbalanced set of explanations, favoring the more populated age groups (25 to 59) while completely
ignoring the recourse potential of individuals older than 60; (ii) the relative group improvement, defined
as
∑
xi∈Xz\Ppi P (xi)[P (y |xij) − P (y |xi)]/
∑
xi∈Xz\Ppi P (xi), where Xz is the set of feature values cor-
responding to age group z and xij is the best response of individuals with initial feature value xi ∈ Xz,
is more balanced across age groups, showing that the matroid constraint can be used to generate coun-
terfactual explanations that help the entire spectrum of the population to self-improve.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have designed several algorithms that allow us to find the decision policies and coun-
terfactual explanations that maximize utility in a setting in which individuals who are subject to the
decisions taken by the policies use the counterfactual explanations they receive to invest effort strategi-
cally. Moreover, we have experimented with synthetic and real lending and credit card data and shown
that the counterfactual explanations and decision policies found by our algorithms achieve higher utility
than several competitive baselines.
By uncovering a previously unexplored connection between strategic machine learning and inter-
pretable machine learning, our work opens up many interesting directions for future work. For example,
we have adopted a specific type of mechanism to provide counterfactual explanations (i.e., one feature
value per individual using a Stackelberg formulation). A natural next step would be to extend our
analysis to other types of mechanisms fitting a variety of real-world applications. Moreover, we have
assumed that the cost individuals pay to change features is given. However, our algorithms would be
more effective if we develop a methodology to reliably estimate the cost function from real observational
(or interventional) data. In our work, we have assumed that features take discrete values and individuals
who are subject to the decisions do not share information between them. It would be interesting to
lift these assumptions, extend our analysis to real-valued feature values, and develop decision policies
and counterfactual explanations that are robust to information sharing between individuals (refer to
Figure 2(c)). Finally, by assuming that P (y |x) does not change after individuals best respond, we are
implicitly assuming that the features x are causal. However, in practice, this assumption is likely to be
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violated, as recently noted by Miller et al. (2019). It would be worth exploring the use of counterfactual
explanations to distinguish between noncausal and causal features.
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A Further related work
Our work builds upon previous work on interpretable machine learning, strategic machine learning, and
machine-assisted decision making.
Most previous work on interpretable machine learning has focused on one of the two following types
of explanations: feature-based explanations (Ribeiro et al., 2016; Koh and Liang, 2017; Lundberg and
Lee, 2017) or counterfactual explanations (Wachter et al., 2017b; Karimi et al., 2019; Mothilal et al.,
2020). Feature-based explanations help individuals understand the importance each feature has on
a particular prediction, typically through local approximation, while counterfactual explanations help
them understand what features would have to change for a predictive model to make a positive prediction
about them. While there is not yet an agreement on what constitutes a good post-hoc explanation in the
literature on interpretable machine learning, counterfactual explanations are gaining prominence because
they place no constraints on the model complexity, do not require model disclosure, facilitate actionable
recourse, and seem to automate compliance with the law (Barocas et al., 2020). Motivated by these
desirable properties, our work focuses on counterfactual explanations and sheds light on the possibility
of using explanations to increase the utility of a decision policy, uncovering a previously unexplored
connection between interpretable machine learning and the nascent field of strategic machine learning.
Similarly as in our work, previous work on strategic machine learning also assumes that individuals
may use knowledge, gained by transparency, to invest effort strategically in order to receive either a
positive prediction (Bru¨ckner and Scheffer, 2011; Dalvi et al., 2004; Dong et al., 2018; Hardt et al.,
2016a; Hu et al., 2019; Milli et al., 2019; Miller et al., 2019; Perdomo et al., 2020) or a beneficial
decision (Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2019; Tabibian et al., 2020). However, none of this previous work
focuses on finding (counterfactual) explanations and they assume full transparency—individuals who are
subject to (semi)-automated decision making can observe the entire predictive model or the decision
policy. As a result, their formulation is fundamentally different and their technical contributions are
orthogonal to ours.
In the machine-assisted decision making literature, the distinction between decisions and predictions
has not been made explicit until very recently (Corbett-Davies et al., 2017; Kilbertus et al., 2019;
Kleinberg et al., 2018; Mitchell et al., 2018; Tabibian et al., 2020; Valera et al., 2018). However, previous
work has focused on the design of optimal decision policies rather than (counterfactual) explanations.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider an instance of the Set Cover problem with a set of elements U = {u1, . . . , un} and a collection
S = {S1, . . . ,Sm} ⊆ 2U such that
⋃
i∈[m] Si = U . In the decision version of the problem, given a constant
k, we need to answer the question whether there are at most k sets from the collection S such that their
union is equal to U or not. With the following procedure, we show that any instance of that problem can
be transformed to an instance of the problem of finding the optimal set of counterfactual explanations,
defined in Eq. 3, in polynomial time.
Consider n+m feature values corresponding to the n elements of U and the m sets of S. Moreover,
denote the first n feature values as xu1 , . . . ,xun and the remaining m as xS1 , . . . ,xSm . We set the decision
maker’s parameter γ to some positive constant less than 1. Then, we set the outcome probabilities
P (y = 1|xui) = γ ∀i ∈ [n] and P (y = 1|xSi) = 1 ∀i ∈ [m] and the policy values pi(xui) = 0 ∀i ∈ [n] and
pi(xSi) = 1 ∀i ∈ [m]. This way, the portion of utility the decision-maker obtains from the first n feature
values is zero, while the portion of utility she obtains from the remaining m is proportional to 1 − γ.
Regarding the cost function, we set c(xui ,xSj ) = 0 ∀(xui ,xSj ) : ui ∈ Sj , c(xui ,xui) = 0 ∀i ∈ [n], and
all the remaining values of the cost function to 2. Finally, we set the initial feature value distribution
to P (xui) =
1
n ∀i ∈ [n] and P (xSi) = 0 ∀i ∈ [m]. A toy example of this transformation is presented in
Figure 4.
In this setting, it easy to observe that an individual with initial feature value xui is always rejected
at first and has the ability to move to a new feature value xSj recommended to her iff c(xui ,xSj ) ≤ 1⇔
ui ∈ Sj . Also, we can easily see that the transformation of instances can be done in O((m+ n)2) time.
Now, assume there exists an algorithm that optimally solves the problem of finding the optimal
set of counterfactual explanations in polynomial time. Given the aforementioned instance and a maxi-
mum number of counterfactual explanations k, the utility u(pi,A) achieved by the set of counterfactual
explanations A the algorithm returns can fall into one of the following two cases:
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Figure 4: Consider that U = {u1, u2} and S = {S1,S2} with S1 = {u1, u2}, S2 = {u2}. The red feature
values have initial population P (x) = 1/2, pi(x) = 0 and P (y = 1 |x) = γ while for the green feature
values it is P (x) = 0, pi(x) = 1 and P (y = 1 |x) = 1. The edges represent the cost between feature
values corresponding to sets and their respective elements while all the non-visible pairwise costs are
equal to 2.
1. u(pi,A) = 1 − γ. This can happen only if all individuals, according to the induced distribution
P (x |pi,A), have moved to some of the feature values xSj , i.e., for all xui with i ∈ [n], there exists
xSj with j ∈ [m] such that xSj ∈ A∧ c(xui ,xSj ) ≤ 1 with |A| ≤ k. As a consequence, if we define
S ′ = {Sj : xSj ∈ A}, it holds that for all ui with i ∈ [n], there exists Sj with j ∈ [m] such that
Sj ∈ S ′ ∧ ui ∈ Sj and therefore S ′ is a set cover with |S ′| = |A| ≤ k.
2. u(pi,A) < 1 − γ. This can happen only if every possible set of k counterfactual explanations
leaves the individuals of at least one feature value xui with a best-response of not following the
counterfactual explanation they were given, i.e., for all A ⊆ Ppi such that |A| ≤ k, there exists xui
with i ∈ [n] such that, for all xSj ∈ A, it holds that c(xui ,xSj ) > 1. Equivalently, it holds that for
all S ′ ⊆ S such that |S ′| ≤ k, there exists ui with i ∈ [n] such that for all Sj ∈ S ′, it holds that
ui 6∈ Sj and therefore there does not exist a set cover of size less or equal than k.
The above directly implies that we can have a decision about any instance of the Set Cover problem
in polynomial time, which is a contradiction unless P = NP . This concludes the reduction and proves
that the problem of finding the optimal set of counterfactual explanations for a given policy is NP-Hard.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
It readily follows that the function f is non-negative from the fact that, if the decision maker is rational,
it holds that pi(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X such that P (y = 1 |x) < γ.
Now, consider two sets A,B ⊆ Ppi : A ⊆ B and a feature value x ∈ Ppi \ B. Also, let ES(xi)
be the counterfactual explanation given to the individuals with initial feature value xi under a set of
counterfactual explanations S. It is easy to see that the marginal difference f(S ∪ {x})− f(S) can only
be affected by individuals with initial features xi such that xi 6∈ Ppi, x ∈ R(xi) and x = ES∪{x}(xi).
Moreover, we can divide all of these individuals into two cases:
1. R(xi)∩A = ∅: in this case, the addition of x to A causes a change in their best-response from xi
to x contributing to the marginal difference of f by a factor P (xi)[P (y = 1 |x)− γ − pi(xi)(P (y =
1 |xi) − γ)]. However, considering the marginal difference of f under the set of counterfactual
explanations B, three subcases are possible:
(a) EB(xi) ∈ R(xi)∧P (y = 1 | EB(xi)) > P (y = 1 |x): the contribution to the marginal difference
of f is zero.
(b) EB(xi) ∈ R(xi)∧P (y = 1 | EB(xi)) ≤ P (y = 1 |x): the contribution to the marginal difference
of f is P (xi)[P (y = 1 |x) − P (y = 1 | EB(xi))]. Since pi is outcome monotonic, EB(xi) ∈ Ppi
and xi 6∈ Ppi, it holds that
P (y = 1 | EB(xi)) ≥ P (y = 1 |xi)⇒
P (y = 1 | EB(xi))− γ ≥ P (y = 1 |xi)− γ > pi(xi)[P (y = 1 |xi)− γ].
13
Therefore, it readily follows that
P (xi)[P (y = 1 |x)− P (y = 1 | EB(xi))] <
P (xi)[P (y = 1 |x)− γ − pi(xi)(P (y = 1 |xi)− γ)].
(c) R(xi) ∩ B = ∅: the contribution to the marginal difference of f is P (xi)[P (y = 1 |x) − γ −
pi(xi)(P (y = 1 |xi)− γ)].
2. R(xi) ∩ A 6= ∅ ∧ P (y = 1 |x) > P (y = 1 | EA(xi)): In this case, the addition of x to A causes a
change in their best-response from EA(xi) to x contributing to the marginal difference of f by a
factor P (xi)[P (y = 1 |x)− P (y = 1 | EA(xi))]. Considering the marginal difference of f under the
set of counterfactual explanations B, two subcases are possible:
(a) EB(xi) ∈ R(xi)∧P (y = 1 | EB(xi)) > P (y = 1 |x): the contribution to the marginal difference
of f is zero.
(b) EB(xi) ∈ R(xi)∧P (y = 1 | EB(xi)) ≤ P (y = 1 |x). Then, the contribution of those individuals
to the marginal difference of f is P (xi)[P (y = 1 |x) − P (y = 1 | EB(xi))]. Since A ⊆ B and
R(xi) ∩ A 6= ∅, it readily follows that
P (y = 1 | EB(xi)) ≥ P (y = 1 | EA(xi))⇒
P (xi)[P (y = 1 |x)− P (y = 1 | EA(xi))] ≥
P (xi)[P (y = 1 |x)− P (y = 1 | EB(xi))].
Finally, because A ⊆ B, we can conclude that f(B ∪ {x})− f(B) 6= 0⇒ f(A∪ {x})− f(A) 6= 0 and
therefore the aforementioned cases are sufficient. Combining all cases, we can see that the contribution of
each individual to the marginal difference of f is always greater or equal under the set of counterfactual
explanations A than under the set of counterfactual explanations B. As a direct consequence, it follows
that f is submodular. Additionally, we can easily see that this contribution is always greater or equal
than zero, leading to the conclusion that f is also monotone.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
By definition, since A ⊆ Ppi∗A , it readily follows that pi∗A(x) = 1 for all x ∈ A. To find the remaining
values of the decision policy, we first observe that, for each x /∈ A, the value of the decision policy pi∗A(x)
does not affect the best-responses of the individuals with initial feature values x′ 6= x. As a result, we
can just set pi∗A(x) for all x /∈ A independently for each feature value x such that the best-response of
the respective individuals is the one that contributes maximally to the overall utility.
First, it is easy to see that, for all x /∈ A such that P (y = 1 |x) < γ, we should set pi∗A(x) = 0. Next,
consider the feature values x /∈ A such that P (y = 1 |x) ≥ γ. Here, we distinguish two cases. If there
exists x′ ∈ A such that c(x,x′) ≤ 1 ∧ P (y = 1 |x′) > P (y = 1 |x), then, if the individuals move to
that x′, the corresponding contribution to the utility will be higher. Moreover, the value of the decision
policy that maximizes their region of adaption (and thus increases their chances of moving to x′) is
clearly pi∗A(x) = 0. If there does not exist x
′ ∈ A such that c(x,x′) ≤ 1 ∧ P (y = 1 |x′) > P (y = 1 |x),
then, the contribution of the corresponding individuals to the utility will be higher if they keep their
initial feature values. Moreover, the value of the decision policy that will maximize this contribution will
be clearly pi∗A(x) = 1.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 5
It readily follows that the function h is non-negative from the fact that, if the decision maker is rational,
pi(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X such that P (y = 1 |x) < γ.
Next, consider two sets A,B ⊆ Y such that A ⊆ B and a feature value x ∈ Y \ B. Also, let ES(xi)
be the counterfactual explanation given to the individuals with initial feature value xi under a set of
counterfactual explanations S. Then, it is clear that the marginal difference h(S ∪ {x}) − h(S) only
depends on individuals with initial features xi such that either 1− c(xi,x) ≥ 0 and x = ES∪{x}(xi) or
xi = x. Moreover, if 1− c(xi,x) ≥ 0 and x = ES∪{x}(xi), the contribution to the marginal difference is
positive and, if xi = x, the contribution to the marginal difference is negative.
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Consider first the individuals with initial features xi such that 1− c(xi,x) ≥ 0 and x = EA∪{x}(xi).
We can divide all of these individuals into three cases:
1. piB(xi) = 0: in this case, xi 6∈ B and the individuals change their best-response from EB(xi) to
x. Moreover, under the set of counterfactual explanations A, their best-response is either xi or
EA(xi) and it changes to x. Then, using a similar argument as in the proof of proposition 2, we
can conclude that the contribution of the individuals to the marginal difference is greater or equal
under the set of counterfactual explanations A than under B.
2. piB(xi) = 1∧piA(xi) = 0: in this case, xi 6∈ A and xi ∈ B. Therefore, under the set of counterfactual
explanations A, the individuals’ best-response changes from EA(xi) to x and there is a positive
contribution to the marginal difference while, under B, the individuals’ best response does not
change and the contribution to the marginal difference is zero.
3. piB(xi) = 1 ∧ piA(xi) = 1: in this case, xi 6∈ B. Therefore, the best-response changes from xi to x
under both sets of counterfactual explanations and there is an equal positive contribution to the
marginal difference.
Now, consider the individuals with initial features xi such that xi = x. We can divide all of these
individuals also into three cases:
1. piA(x) = piB(x) = 0: in this case, under both sets of counterfactual explanations, the counter-
factual explanation x changes the value of the decision policy to piA∪{x}(x) = piB∪{x}(x) = 1.
Moreover, the contribution to the marginal difference is less negative under the set of coun-
terfactual explanations A than under B since P (y = 1 | EA(x)) ≤ P (y = 1 | EB(x)) and thus
P (x)[P (y = 1 |x)− P (y = 1 | EA(x))] ≥ P (x)[P (y = 1 |x)− P (y = 1 | EB(x))].
2. piA(x) = 1∧piB(x) = 0: in this case, under the set of counterfactual explanations A, the individuals’
best response does not change and thus the contribution to the marginal difference is zero and, under
the set of counterfactual explanations B, their best-response changes from EB(x) to x and thus there
is a negative contribution to the marginal difference i.e., P (x)[P (y = 1 |x)−P (y = 1 | EB(x))] < 0.
3. piA(x) = piB(x) = 1: in this case, under both sets of counterfactual explanations, the individuals’
best response does not change and thus the contribution to the marginal difference is zero.
As a direct consequence of the above observations, it readily follows that h(A ∪ {x}) − h(A) ≥
h(B ∪ {x})− h(B) and therefore the function h is submodular.
However, in contrast with Section 3, the function h is non-monotone since it can happen that the
negative marginal contribution exceeds the positive one. For example, consider the following instance of
the problem, where x ∈ {1, 2, 3} with γ = 0.1:
P (x) = 0.1 I(x = 1) + 0.8 I(x = 2) + 0.1 I(x = 3),
P (y = 1 |x) = 1.0 I(x = 1) + 0.5 I(x = 2) + 0.4 I(x = 3),
and
c(xi,xj) =
0.0 0.2 0.30.3 0.0 0.7
0.4 0.5 0.0
 .
Assume there is a set of counterfactual explanations A = {1}. Then, the optimal policy is given by
pi∗A(1) = 1, pi
∗
A(2) = 0, pi
∗
A(3) = 0 inducing a movement from feature values 2, 3 to feature value 1, giving
a utility equal to 0.9. Now, add x = 2 to the set of counterfactual explanations i.e., A = {1, 2}. Then,
the optimal policy is given by pi∗A(1) = 1, pi
∗
A(2) = 1, pi
∗
A(3) = 0 inducing a movement from feature value
3 to feature value 1, giving a lower utility, equal to 0.5. Therefore, the function h is non-monotone.
C Additional details on the standard greedy algorithm and the
randomized algorithm by Buchbinder et al. (2014)
Algorithm 1 summarizes the standard greedy algorithm, which starts from a solution set A = ∅ and it
iteratively adds to A the counterfactual explanation x ∈ Ppi \ A that provides the maximum marginal
difference f(A ∪ {x})− f(A)
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ALGORITHM 1: Standard greedy algorithm (Nemhauser et al., 1978)
Input: Ground set of counterfactual explanations Ppi, parameter k and utility function f
Output: Set of counterfactual explanations A
1: A ← ∅
2: while |A| ≤ k do
3: x∗ ← argmaxx∈Ppi\Af(A ∪ {x})− f(A)
4: A ← A∪ {x∗}
5: end while
6: return A
ALGORITHM 2: Randomized algorithm by Buchbinder et al. (2014)
Input: Ground set of counterfactual explanations Y, parameter k and utility function f
Output: Set of counterfactual explanations A
1: A ← ∅
2: while |A| ≤ k do
3: B ← GetTopK(Y,A, f)
4: x∗ ∼ B
5: A ← A∪ {x∗}
6: end while
7: return A
Algorithm 2 is just a randomized variation of the standard greedy algorithm. It starts from a solution
set A = ∅ and it iteratively adds one counterfactual explanation x ∈ Y\A. However, instead of greedily
choosing the element x that provides the maximum marginal difference h(A ∪ {x}) − h(A), it sorts all
the candidate elements with respect to their marginal difference (line 3) and picks one at random among
the top k (line 4).
To enjoy a 1/e approximation guarantee, Algorithm 2 requires that there are 2k < m candidate
feature values whose marginal contribution to any set is zero. In our problem, this can be trivially
satisfied by adding 2k feature values x to X such that P (y = 1 |x) = γ, P (x) = 0 and c(x,xj) =
c(xj ,x) = 2 ∀xj ∈ X . If the algorithm adds some of those counterfactual explanations to the set A, it
is easy to see that we can ignore them without causing any difference in utility or best-responses.
D Jointly optimizing the decision policy and the counterfactual
explanations
Figure 5 shows that, by jointly optimizing both the decision policy and the counterfactual explanations,
we may obtain an additional gain in terms of utility in comparison with just optimizing for the set of
counterfactual explanations given the optimal decision policy in a non-strategic setting.
E Experiments on Synthetic Data
Experimental setup. For simplicity, we consider feature values x ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} and P (x = i) =
pi/
∑
j pj where pi is sampled from a Gaussian distribution N(µ = 0.5, σ = 0.1) truncated from below
at zero. We also sample P (y = 1 |x) ∼ U [0, 1], c(xi,xj) ∼ U [0, 1] for 50% of all pairs and c(xi,xj) = 2
for the rest. Finally, we set γ = 0.3. In this section, we compare the utility achieved by our explanation
methods with the same baselines we used on real data.
Results. Figures 6(a,b) show the utility achieved by each of the decision policies and counterfactual
explanations for several numbers of feature values m and counterfactual explanations k. We find several
interesting insights: (i) the decision policies given by Eq. 5 and the counterfactual explanations found by
Algorithm 2 beat all other alternatives by large margins across the whole spectrum, showing that jointly
optimizing the decision policy and the counterfactual explanations offer clear additional gains; (ii) the
counterfactual explanations found by Algorithms 1 and 2 provide higher utility gains as the number of
feature values increases and thus the search space of counterfactual explanations becomes larger; and,
(iii) a small number of counterfactual explanations is enough to provide significant gains in terms of
utility with respect to the optimal decision policy without counterfactual explanations.
16
𝒙𝟐𝒙𝟏 𝒙𝟑 𝒙𝟒
ℛ(𝒙𝟒)
ℛ(𝒙𝟑)
Non-strategic policy
P y = 1	 	𝐱) = 1
𝑃 𝑦 = 1	 	𝒙) =	0𝜋(𝒙) =	1𝜋(𝒙) =	0 ℰ(𝒙𝟏) ℰ(𝒙𝟐)
ℛ(𝒙𝟏) ℛ(𝒙𝟐)
𝒙𝟐𝒙𝟏
𝒙𝟑
𝒙𝟑 𝒙𝟒
Strategic policy
Figure 5: Jointly optimizing the decision policy and the counterfactual explanations can offer additional
gains. The left panel shows the optimal (deterministic) decision policy pi under non-strategic behavior, as
given by Eq. 6. Here, there does not exist a set of counterfactual explanations A ∈ Ppi that increases the
utility of the policy. This happens because the area of adaption of x3 and x4 does not include any feature
value that receives a positive decision. The right panel shows the decision policy and counterfactual
explanations that are (jointly) optimal in terms of utility, as given by Eq. 4. Here, the individuals with
feature values x1 and x2 receive E(x1) and E(x2), respectively, as counterfactual explanations. Since
these explanations are within their areas of adaptationR(x1) andR(x2), they change their initial feature
values in order to receive a positive decision.
10 20 50 100 200
m
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
U
ti
lit
y,
u
(pi
,A
)
Black box
Minimum cost
Diverse
Algorithm 1
Algorithm 2
(a) Utility vs. # feature values
10 2 5 10 20 30 40
k
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
U
ti
lit
y,
u
(pi
,A
)
Black box
Minimum cost
Diverse
Algorithm 1
Algorithm 2
(b) Utility vs. # explanations
10 2 5 10 20 30 40
k
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
A
ve
ra
ge
in
d
iv
id
u
al
co
st
Black box
Minimum cost
Diverse
Algorithm 1
Algorithm 2
(c) Individual cost vs. # expla-
nations
Figure 6: Results on synthetic data. Panels (a) and (b) show the utility achieved by six types of decision
policies and counterfactual explanations against the total number of feature values m and the number
of counterfactual explanations k, respectively. Panel (c) shows the average cost individuals had to pay
to change from their initial features to the feature value of the counterfactual explanation they receive
under the same five types of decision policies and counterfactual explanations. In Panel (a), we set
k = 0.1m and, in Panels (b) and (c), we set m = 200. In all panels, we repeat each experiment 20 times.
Figure 6(c) shows the average cost individuals had to pay to change from their initial features to
the feature value of the counterfactual explanation they receive. As one may have expected, the results
show that, under the counterfactual explanations of minimum cost (Minimum cost and Diverse), the
individuals invest less effort to change their initial features and the effort drops as the number of coun-
terfactual explanations increases. In contrast, our methods incentivize the individuals to achieve the
highest self-improvement, particularly when we jointly optimize the decision policy and the counterfac-
tual explanations.
F Additional details on the experiments on real data
F.1 Feature representation & preprocessing steps
For each applicant in the lending dataset, the label y indicates whether an applicant fully pays a loan
(y = 1) or ends up to a default/charge-off (y = 0) and the features x are:
• Loan Amount: The amount that the applicant initially requested.
• Employment Length: How long the applicant has been employed.
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• Debt to Income Ratio: The ratio between the applicant’s financial debts and her average income.
• FICO Score: The applicant’s FICO score, which is a credit score based on consumer credit files.
The FICO scores are in the range of 300-850 and the average of the high and low range for the
FICO score of each applicant has been used for this study.
• Annual Income: The declared annual income of the applicant.
Here, we assume that all of the aforementioned features are actionable, meaning that an individual denied
a loan can change their values in order to get a positive decision.
For each credit card holder in the credit dataset, the label indicates whether a credit card holder will
default during the next month (y = 0) or not (y = 1) and the features x are:
• Marital status: Whether the person is married or single.
• Age Group: Group depending on the person’s age (< 25, 25− 39, 40− 59, > 60).
• Education Level: The level of education the individual has acquired (1-4).
• Maximum Bill Amount Over Last 6 Months
• Maximum Payment Amount Over Last 6 Months
• Months With Zero Balance Over Last 6 Months
• Months With Low Spending Over Last 6 Months
• Months With High Spending Over Last 6 Months
• Most Recent Bill Amount
• Most Recent Payment Amount
• Total Overdue Counts
• Total Months Overdue
Here, we assume that all features except Marital Status, Age Group and Education Level are actionable
and, among the actionable features, we assume that Total Overdue Counts and Total Months Overdue
can only increase.
In both cases, note that the actionable features are numerical, however, our methodology only allows
for discrete valued features. Therefore, rather than using the numerical values as features, we first cluster
the loan applicants (or credit card holders) into k groups based on the original numerical features using
k-clustering and then, for each applicant (or credit card holder), use the cluster identifier it belongs to,
represented using a one-hot encoding, as a feature. After this preprocessing step, the discrete feature
values xi consists of all possible value combinations of discrete non-actionable features, if any, and cluster
identifiers.
To approximate the values of the conditional distribution P (y |x), we train four types of classifiers
(Multi-layer perceptron, support vector machine, logistic regression, decision tree) using the default
scikit-learn parameters and then choose the pair of classifier type and number of clusters k that maximizes
accuracy, estimated using 5-fold cross validation. Finally, we set γ equal to the 50-th percentile of all
the individuals’ P (y = 1 |x) values causing a 50% acceptance rate by the optimal threshold policy in
the non strategic setting. Table F.1 summarizes the resulting experimental setup for both datasets.
F.2 Computation of the cost between feature values
To model each individual’s best response, we need to estimate the cost between each pair of feature
values c(xi,xj). Inspired by Ustun et al. (2019), we compute this cost based on the maximum percentile
shift among actionable features. More specifically, let L be the set of actionable numerical features and
L¯ be the set of non-actionable (discrete-valued) features and note that, in the credit dataset, L¯ contains
Marital Status, Age Group and Education Level and L¯ contains the remaining features consist L and,
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Table 1: Dataset details
Dataset # of samples Classifier k Accuracy m γ
credit 30000 Logistic Regression 100 80.4% 3200 0.85
lending 1266817 Logistic Regression 400 89.9% 400 0.97
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Figure 7: Transportation of mass induced by the policies and counterfactual explanations used in Al-
gorithm 1 and 2 in both the lending and the credit dataset. For each individual in the population,
whose best-response is to change her feature value, we record her outcome P (y = 1 |x) before the best
response (Initial P (y = 1 |x)) and after the best response (Final P (y = 1 |x)). In each panel, the color
is proportional to the percentage of individuals who move from initial P (y = 1 |x) to final P (y = 1 |x)
and we set α = 2.
in the lending dataset, L contains all features. Then, for each pair of feature values xi,xj we define the
cost function as:
c(xi,xj) =
{
α ·maxl∈L |Ql(xj,l)−Ql(xi,l)| if xi,l = xj,l ∀l ∈ L¯
∞ otherwise, (7)
where xj,l is the value of the l-th feature for the feature value xj , Ql(·) is the CDF of the numerical feature
l ∈ L and α ≥ 1 is a scaling factor. As an exception, in the credit dataset, we always set the cost c(xi,xj)
between two feature values to∞ ifQl(xj,l) < Ql(xi,l) for l ∈ {Total Overdue Counts,Total Months Overdue}
considering the fact that history of overdue payments cannot be erased.
Finally, we would like to acknowledge that more sophisticated cost functions can be designed in terms
of feasibility and difficulty of adaptation, taking into account domain knowledge and information about
the deployed classifier, however, it goes beyond the scope of our work.
F.3 Transportation of mass
To measure the transportation of mass induced by the policies and counterfactual explanations used in
Algorithm 1 and 2 in both the lending and the credit dataset, we proceed as follows. For each individual
in the population whose best-response is to change her feature value, we record her outcome P (y = 1 |x)
before and after the best response. Then, we discretize the outcome values using percentiles. Figure 7
summarizes the results, which show several interesting insights. In the lending dataset, we observe that
a large portion of individuals do improve their outcome even if we only optimize the counterfactual
explanations (Panel (a)). In contrast, in the credit dataset, we observe that, if we only optimize the
counterfactual explanations (Panel (c)), most individuals do not improve their outcome. That being
said, if we jointly optimize the decision policy and counterfactual explanations (Panels (b) and (d)), we
are able to incentivize a large portion of individuals to self improve in both datasets.
F.4 Examples of counterfactual explanations
In this section, we focus on the credit dataset and look more closely into the counterfactual explanations
Em(x) and E(x) provided by the minimum cost baseline and Algorithm 1, respectively, by means of
an (anecdotal) example. To this end, for a fixed α and k, we first track down the individuals whose
best-response under both methods is to change their initial features to the provided counterfactual
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Table 2: Counterfactual explanations Em(x) and E(x) provided by the minimum cost baseline and
Algorithm 1, respectively, to an individual with initial feature value x. Initially, the individual’s outcome
is P (y = 1 |x) = 0.84 and, after best-response, her outcome is P (y = 1 | Em(x)) = 0.87 and P (y =
1 | E(x)) = 0.89, respectively. In both methods, we set α = 2 and k = 160.
Feature x Em(x) E(x)
Married No No No
Age group Under 25 Under 25 Under 25
Education Student Student Student
Maximum Bill Amount Over Last 6 Months $2246 $2084 $1929
Maximum Payment Amount Over Last 6 Months $191 $188 $221
Months With Zero Balance Over Last 6 Months 0 0 0
Months With Low Spending Over Last 6 Months 0 0 0
Months With High Spending Over Last 6 Months 4 2 1
Most Recent Bill Amount $2145 $2003 $1750
Most Recent Payment Amount $123 $124 $100
Total Overdue Counts 0 0 0
Total Months Overdue 0 0 0
explanation. Then, for each of these individuals, we compare the counterfactual explanations provided
by each of both methods.
Table F.4 shows the initial features x together with the counterfactual explanations Em(x) and E(x)
for one of the above individuals picked at random. In this example, the individual is a university student,
unmarried and under the age of 25 who is advised to follow the counterfactual explanations to maintain
her credit. Since the marital status, age group and level of education are all non-actionable features,
both counterfactual explanations maintain the initial values for those features. Under the minimum cost
baseline, the bank would advise the individual to reduce her monthly credit card bill by ∼$150 and
limit high spending to 2 months per semester so that her risk of default would decrease from 16% to
13%. However, under Algorithm 1, the bank would advise to reduce her monthly credit card bill by
∼$400, limit high spending to 1 month per semester, and additionally increase her monthly credit card
payoff slightly so that her risk of default would decrease to 11%. Since by construction, both Em(x) and
E(x) are inside the region of adaptation of x, the individual is guaranteed to follow the advise in both
cases, however, under Algorithm 1, the individual would be less likely to default and achieve a superior
long-term well being.
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